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CAROL A. CHASE*
Is Crawford a “Get Out of Jail Free”
Card for Batterers and Abusers?
An Argument for a Narrow
Definition of “Testimonial”
It is difficult to overstate the impact of Crawford v. Washing-ton1 on domestic violence and familial abuse prosecutions.
Not infrequently, the victims in such cases become unavailable
by the time of trial.  This has forced prosecutors to depend, at
least in part, on the use of hearsay statements made by victims
during or shortly after the alleged crime.2  Frequently, such state-
ments are made during 911 calls for assistance3 or in spontaneous
utterances to law enforcement officers or other persons.4  While
many of these statements fit neatly into well-recognized excep-
tions to the hearsay rule—such as the exceptions for excited ut-
terances5 or statements made for the purpose of obtaining
* Professor of Law, Pepperdine University School of Law.  I am grateful for the
excellent assistance of my research assistant Christopher Wollan and for the
thoughtful review and helpful comments by Professor L. Timothy Perrin, Professor
Tom Lininger, and Judge John P. Doyle.
1 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
2 See, e.g. , United States v. Arnold, 410 F.3d 895, 897-98 (6th Cir. 2005); People v.
Corella, 18 Cal. Rptr. 3d 770, 773 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004); Hammon v. State, 829
N.E.2d 444, 446-47 (Ind. 2005); Spencer v. State, 162 S.W.3d 877, 878 (Tex. Ct. App.
2005).
3 See, e.g.,  Fowler v. State, 829 N.E.2d 459, 462 (Ind. 2005); People v. Moscat, 777
N.Y.S.2d 875, 879 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 2004); State v. Powers, 99 P.3d 1262, 1263 (Wash.
Ct. App. 2004).
4 See, e.g. , Boctking v. Bayer, 399 F.3d 1019 (9th Cir. 2005) (trial court admitted
graphic description by young sexual abuse victim contained in statements made to
the victim’s mother); People v. Griffin, 33 Cal. 4th 536, 579 (Cal. 2004) (upholding
admission of statement by victim made to a friend); Demons v. State, 595 S.E.2d 76,
79-80 (Ga. 2004) (statements by victim to co-worker); Hammon , 829 N.E.2d at 458
(statement to the police officers at the crime scene held to not be testimonial).
5 See FED. R. EVID. 803(2). See, e.g. , Leavitt v. Arave, 383 F.3d 809, 830 n.22 (9th
Cir. 2004); Fowler , 829 N.E.2d at 463; People v. Diaz, 798 N.Y.S.2d 21 (N.Y. App.
Div. 2005).
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medical diagnosis or treatment6—prior to the Crawford decision,
a number of states had addressed the hearsay issues common to
domestic violence and child abuse cases by enacting new excep-
tions to the hearsay rule.7
Prior to Crawford , the admissibility of hearsay statements in
the face of the Confrontation Clause had depended upon finding
that the hearsay statement was reliable.8  Reliability was pre-
sumed if the hearsay statement was admissible under a firmly
rooted exception to the hearsay rule.9  If not, then reliability had
to be established by showing that the statement was made under
circumstances providing particularized guarantees of trustworthi-
ness.10 Crawford has now revised the effect of the Confrontation
6 See FED. R. EVID. 803(4). See, e.g. , Petersen v. United States, 352 F. Supp. 2d
1016, 1027 (D.S.D. 2004); People v. Compan, 100 P.3d 533 (Colo. Ct. App. 2004);
State v. Robinson, 669 N.W.2d 790 (Minn. Ct. App. 2005).
7 See, e.g. , ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1416 (2004); CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 1360,
1370, 1380 (West Supp. 2005); FLA. STAT. § 90-803(23), (24) (2005); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 40.460 (2003); OREGON EVID. CODE 803(26); MISS. R. EVID. 803(25).  The Califor-
nia statute, for example, provides as follows:
(a) Evidence of a statement by a declarant is not made inadmissible by the
hearsay rule if all of the following conditions are met:
(1) The statement purports to narrate, describe or explain the inflic-
tion or threat of physical injury upon the declarant.
(2) The declarant is unavailable as a witness pursuant to Section 240.
(3) The statement was made at or near the time of the infliction or
threat of physical injury. . . .
(4) The statement was made under circumstances that would indicate
its trustworthiness.
(5) The statement was made in writing, was electronically recorded, or
made to a physician, nurse, paramedic, or to a law enforcement
official.
(b) For purposes of paragraph 4 of subdivision (a), circumstances relevant
to the issue of trustworthiness include, but are not limited to, the
following:
(1) Whether the statement was made in contemplation of pending or
anticipated litigation in which the declarant was interested;
(2) Whether the declarant has a bias or motive for fabricating the
statement, and the extent of any bias or motive.
(3) Whether the statement is corroborated by evidence other than
statements that are admissible only pursuant to this section.
CAL. EVID CODE § 1370 (West Supp. 2005).
8 Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 65-66 (1980).
9 Id.  at 66.
10 For an excellent review of Supreme Court Confrontation Clause jurisprudence
prior to the Crawford decision, see Tom Lininger, Prosecuting Batterers After Craw-
ford, 91 VA. L. REV. 747, 775-60 (2005). See also Carol A. Chase, The Fives Faces of
the Confrontation Clause , 40 HOUS. L. REV. 1003, 1036-61 (2003); W. Jeremy Coun-
seller & Shannon Rickett, The Confrontation Clause After  Crawford v. Washington:
Smaller Mouth, Bigger Teeth , 57 BAYLOR L. REV. 1, 5-6, 10-12 (2005); Richard D.
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Clause on the admissibility of hearsay evidence so that admissi-
bility now depends upon whether the hearsay statement is “testi-
monial.”11  If testimonial hearsay evidence is at issue, the
Confrontation Clause excludes the evidence unless it is shown
that the maker of the statement is unavailable and that the defen-
dant had a prior opportunity for cross-examination.12  According
to the Crawford majority, it is consistent with the Framers’ de-
sign to exempt nontestimonial  hearsay “from Confrontation
Clause scrutiny altogether.”13
The Crawford decision declined to spell out a comprehensive
definition of what hearsay is “testimonial,” stating that it applies
at a minimum to prior testimony at a preliminary hearing, before
a grand jury, at a former trial, or to statements made during po-
lice interrogations.14  Some scholars have urged the adoption of a
broad definition of the types of statements that are testimonial,
which would include almost all out-of-court statements by a vic-
tim, such as those made during 911 calls and verbal statements to
responding officers.15  Such a broad definition will place many
prosecutors of familial abuse and domestic violence cases—
where the victim is often unavailable—in a situation where they
are unable to proceed, even when the underlying circumstances
provide compelling indicia that the victim’s hearsay statements
are reliable.  The harsh reality under Crawford  is that batterers
and abusers may potentially escape prosecution for their crimes.
This Article argues in Part I that a narrow definition of “testi-
monial statements” is more consistent with the purpose of the
Confrontation Clause.  In essence, for Confrontation Clause pur-
Friedman, The Confrontation Clause Re-Rooted and Transformed , 2004 CATO SUP.
CT. REV. 439, 446-50 (2004); Christ Hutton, Sir Walter Raleigh Revived:  The Su-
preme Court Re-Vamps Two Decades of Confrontation Clause Precedent in  Craw-
ford v. Washington, 50 S.D. L. REV. 41, 41-47 (2005).




15 See, e.g. , Lininger, supra note 10, at 773-81, 818-19 (suggesting that labeling
most statements by victims to police officers as nontestimonial is not true to the
Crawford Court’s interpretation of the Confrontation Clause); Friedman, supra
note 10, at 457-62; Robert P. Mosteller, Crawford v. Washington: Encouraging and
Ensuring the Confrontation of Witnesses , 39 U. RICH L. REV. 511, 594 (2005) (view-
ing a broad construction of what is testimonial as encouraging the prosecutor to call
child witnesses to testify).  These authors address the concern over the loss of vic-
tim’s statements by focusing on procedures that might increase opportunities for
confrontation.
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poses a statement should be found to be testimonial only if  there
is government involvement in creating the statement with an eye
toward admitting the statement at a trial.  This definition is con-
sistent with the Framers’ objectives in requiring confrontation.16
It also more accurately captures the intended role of the Con-
frontation Clause, which is to specify the method by which the
reliability of a certain class of evidence—testimony and testimo-
nial evidence—will be tested.17 Crawford relieves the Confron-
tation Clause of shouldering the burden of assuring the reliability
of all hearsay evidence, as had been the practice under the Ohio
v. Roberts18 line of cases from which Crawford departs.19  Relia-
bility of evidence is, of course, an appropriate concern in deter-
mining whether to admit evidence in a criminal case, but general
concerns about the reliability of evidence are more appropriately
within the purview of the Due Process Clause and the evidence
codes, as is discussed in Part II. In Part III, this Article explores
the application of this framework to types of hearsay evidence
that are often available in domestic violence and familial abuse
cases.  Finally, in Part IV, this Article considers the doctrine of
forfeiture as a means of admitting even “testimonial” hearsay
and briefly notes ways in which the reliability of hearsay evi-
dence can be tested even without confrontation.
I
AN OUT-OF-COURT STATEMENT IS ONLY TESTIMONIAL IF THE
GOVERNMENT PROCURED THE STATEMENT FOR THE PURPOSE
OF USING IT AS TRIAL TESTIMONY
Neither Crawford , nor the policy reasons cited by Crawford ,
nor the plain language of the Confrontation Clause support a
broad definition of “testimonial statements” that would include
all statements by any declarant who might anticipate their use in
a criminal prosecution.  Rather, an essential component of any
testimonial statement is government involvement in creating a
statement that the government expects to offer in lieu of live trial
testimony.  A critical reading of Crawford clearly affirms this
proposition, as does the plain language of the Confrontation
Clause.
16 See infra  Part I.A.
17 See infra  Part II, notes 78-79 and accompanying text.
18 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
19 See infra Part II, notes 78-79 and accompanying text.
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A. The Policies Underlying Crawford Support a Conclusion
that Government Involvement is an Essential Component of
Testimonial Statements
In an effort to determine the scope of the Confrontation
Clause, which provides that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the wit-
nesses against him,”20  the Crawford Court examined the histori-
cal backdrop against which the Clause was drafted.  The opinion
focused upon the continental form of civil law ex parte pretrial
examinations, which had found their way into evidence in En-
glish common law criminal prosecutions.21  During the colonial
period this controversial practice made its way to the Colonies.22
Under this practice, ex parte examinations were typically con-
ducted by justices of the peace and the results of those examina-
tions were read at trial.23 Crawford cited the trial of Sir Walter
Raleigh24 as an example of these abusive practices.  At that trial,
Raleigh’s alleged accomplice, Lord Cobham, had been examined
by the Privy Council and his examination had been admitted at
trial under protest by Raleigh, who unsuccessfully pressed to
have his accuser testify.25  As a further illustration of the type of
abuses against which the Confrontation Clause was intended to
protect, the Crawford majority cited the Massachusetts ratifying
convention, at which one participant objected to the Federal
Constitution’s omission of a right of confrontation, worrying that,
as drafted, Congress would possess powers enabling it to estab-
lish court procedures similar to those used in the Spanish
Inquisition.26
Significantly, the Crawford Court declared that the “principal
evil” at which the Confrontation Clause was aimed was this civil
20 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
21 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S.  36, 42-50 (2004).
22 Id. at 47-50.
23 Id.  at 44.
24 Id.  Although the historical origins of the Confrontation Clause are somewhat
murky, and there is nothing to indicate that the trial of Raleigh was actually dis-
cussed by the Framers, see Kenneth W. Graham, Jr., The Right of Confrontation and
the Hearsay Rule:  Sir Walter Raleigh Loses Another One , 8 CRIM. L. BULL. 99, 100
n.4 (1972), there is little question that this notorious trial exemplifies the dangers
against which the Confrontation Clause seeks to protect.
25 See Raleigh’s Case, The Trial of Sir Walter Raleigh, Knt. At Winchester, for
High Treason, 2 HOW. ST. TRL 1, 15-16 (1603).
26 Crawford , 541 U.S. at 48-49 (citing 2 The Debates in the Several State Conven-
tions on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution  110-11 (Jonathan Elliot 2d ed.
1863)).
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law practice of using ex parte pretrial examinations against an
accused in criminal proceedings.27  The Court noted that “not all
hearsay implicates the Sixth Amendment’s core concerns.”28
“An off-hand, overheard remark might be unreliable evidence
and thus a good candidate for exclusion under hearsay rules, but
it bears little resemblance to the civil-law abuses the Confronta-
tion Clause targeted.”29
The significance of this passage should not be understated.
Here, the Court clearly recognized that the focus of the Confron-
tation Clause is narrower than the general reliability of hearsay
evidence.  Rather, the focus is on the abusive government prac-
tice of engaging in ex parte examinations for the purpose of cre-
ating testimonial evidence to be used at trial.  As Justice Scalia,
writing for the majority, noted:  “Involvement of government of-
ficers in the production of testimony with an eye toward trial
presents unique potential for prosecutorial abuse — a fact borne
out time and again throughout a history with which the Framers
were keenly familiar.”30
The history underlying the adoption of the Confrontation
Clause, and the purpose that the Framers intended it to serve,
clearly reveal that involvement of government officials in the cre-
ation of witness statements for use at trial is an essential compo-
nent of a “testimonial statement” as defined in Crawford.
B. The Crawford Opinion Expressly Refers to Government
Involvement in Characterizing a Statement as Testimonial
Although the Court expressly declined to define categorically
the types of out-of-court statements that may be considered testi-
monial,31 the opinion repeatedly supports a determination that
government involvement in the creation of the statement is an
essential component of this definition.  It is clear that the term
“testimonial” must be determined by the type of abuse to which
the Confrontation Clause is directed—ex parte pretrial examina-
tions.  In noting that the term “testimonial” applies at a mini-
mum to prior testimony at preliminary hearings, before a grand
jury, and at a former trial, as well as to statements made during
27 Id.  at 50.
28 Id. at 51.
29 Id.
30 Id.  at 56 n.7.
31 Id. at 68.
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police interrogations, the Court emphasized that these practices
have “the closest kinship to the abuses at which the Confronta-
tion Clause was directed.”32
Further, the Court was careful to distinguish between state-
ments made to government officers as opposed to remarks made
to others.  As previously discussed, Crawford notes that “[a]n
off-hand, overheard remark” may be excluded as inadmissible
hearsay, but its admission does not run afoul of the Sixth
Amendment because it “bears little resemblance to the civil-law
abuses the Confrontation Clause targeted.”33  The opinion also
distinguishes between a formal statement made by an accuser to
the government, which the opinion characterizes as a statement
by one who “bears testimony,” and a statement in the form of a
casual remark made by a person to an acquaintance, which is not
testimonial.34
Twice in the Crawford opinion there is language that appears
to shift its focus from the government action used in obtaining
the statements to the perception of the witness making the state-
ments.  In citing various proposed formulations of statements
that may be determined to be “testimonial,” the Court refers to
“material such as affidavits, custodial examinations, prior testi-
mony . . . or similar pretrial statements that the declarants would
reasonably expect to be used prosecutorially .”35  In addition,
quoting from an amicus brief filed by the National Association
of Criminal Defense Lawyers, the Court lists as another possible
formulation, “statements that were made under circumstances
which would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that
the statement would be available for use at a later trial.”36  This
language has caused some writers to conclude that government
involvement in creating the hearsay statement is not always nec-
essary.37  Indeed, one scholar has posited a situation in which a
witness, on her own, shoved a written statement under the court-
house door asserting that the accused did in fact commit the
crime.38  He concludes, “that would plainly be testimonial even
though no government official played a role in preparing the
32 Id.
33 Id. at 51.
34 Id.
35 Id.  (emphasis added).
36 Id.  at 52.
37 See, e.g. , Friedman, supra  note 10, at 457-48; Mosteller, supra  note 15, at 573.
38 Friedman, supra  note 10 at 458.
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statement.”39  Yet, this statement propounded by the witness act-
ing on her own is not even distantly related to the ex parte pre-
trial examinations targeted by the Confrontation Clause.  It is
true that the statement would likely fail the reliability safeguards
inherent in the hearsay exceptions, and therefore would be inad-
missible under the hearsay rules, but Crawford takes great care
to disentangle the Confrontation Clause from issues of the mere
reliability of hearsay.40
But then why does the Court even refer to two possible formu-
lations that consider, at least in part, the perceptions of the per-
son making the statement—more specifically, whether the maker
of the statement would reasonably believe that the statement
would be used at a trial?  There are at least two possible explana-
tions short of leaping to the conclusion that all accusatory state-
ments are testimonial.  One explanation is that the Court
implicitly recognized that, while government involvement is a
necessary component in the creation of a testimonial statement,
it is not sufficient  to deem a statement testimonial.  Rather, a
statement to a government official is only testimonial if it is made
under circumstances that would cause a reasonable witness to be-
lieve that the statement would be available for later use at a trial.
This would clearly be the case where the police are interrogating
a suspect in custody following the advisement of the Miranda
rights.41  It may also be the case in a formal police interrogation
where a witness is asked to sign a written statement or to verify
the accuracy of a recorded statement.  It would likely not  be the
case—in the absence of circumstances indicating otherwise—
where a crime victim calls 911 and pleads for assistance.  In the
39 Id.
40 See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51 (2004) (noting that a hearsay
statement may be excluded under the hearsay rules even though “it bears little re-
semblance to the civil-law abuses the Confrontation Clause targeted.”).  Friedman
also cites as support a notation in the Crawford opinion that one of the statements
involved in the Raleigh case was a letter.  Friedman, supra  note 10, at 458.  This is
far removed from an indication that the Framers were even cognizant of that ob-
scure fact, or that the Framers would have considered that such a letter, which would
almost certainly have been inadmissible under then-current practices, involved the
type of practice at which the Confrontation Clause was directed.  The Confrontation
Clause is not a general guarantor of reliability but rather provides a procedure by
which a narrow class of out-of-court statements—testimonial statements—can be
tested. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 61.
41 A key component of the Miranda  warnings is the advice that “anything [you]
say[ ] can be used against [you] in a court of law.”  Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,
479 (1966).
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latter situation, it is likely that the endangered caller’s purpose is
to seek help, and it is highly improbable that the caller would
even consider whether the statement would be used at trial.
Of course, there is another more obvious explanation for the
language in Crawford referring to what the declarant would an-
ticipate the use of his or her statement to be:  that language is
derived from the petitioner’s brief42 and from the amicus brief of
the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers,43 both of
which have an interest in the Court adopting a broad definition
of “testimonial” hearsay.  Such a definition will exclude more in-
criminating evidence than a narrower definition.  The paragraph
in which these excerpts from the briefs appear merely illustrates
various suggested formulations of tests that could be used to de-
termine which statements are testimonial.44  The Court expressly
did not endorse any particular formulation and, indeed, that
same paragraph includes another possible formulation proposing
a much narrower standard:  “extrajudicial statements . . . con-
tained in formalized testimonial materials, such as affidavits, dep-
ositions, prior testimony, or confessions.”45  The Court did not
find it necessary to choose which of the possible formulations
best describes what makes an out-of-court statement “testimo-
nial,” because it recognized that “[s]tatements taken by police
officers in the course of interrogations are also testimonial under
even a narrow standard.”46 Crawford concerned precisely this
type of statement.
The Tenth Circuit’s decision in United States v. Summers47 pro-
vides an example of the mischief that can occur when a court
misreads Crawford  as requiring only that a person in the declar-
ant’s position would “objectively” foresee that his or her state-
ment would be used at trial.  In Summers , the defendant’s
accomplice, after his arrest and as he was being walked to a pa-
trol car, asked, “How did you guys find us so fast?”48  The court
found the statement to be testimonial despite the absence of Mi-
randa  warnings or formal interrogation, and despite the absence
42 Crawford , 541 U.S. at 51.
43 Id. at 53.
44 Id. at 51-52.
45 Id.
46 Id.  at 52.
47 414 F.3d 1287 (10th Cir. 2005).
48 Id. at 1302.
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of government involvement in eliciting the statement.49  The
court reached its result by finding “that a reasonable person in
[the declarant’s] position would objectively foresee that an incul-
patory statement implicating himself and others might be used in
a subsequent investigation or prosecution.”50
While it may be true that a reasonable judge, law professor, or
attorney might “objectively” foresee that a question directed by
an arrestee to the police could become evidence at a trial, it
verges on the absurd to believe that a reasonable layperson
would so foresee in the absence of any of the trappings of an
interrogation.  Indeed, one wonders why a criminal suspect
would ever volunteer such an incriminating question if use of this
evidence at trial is so “objectively” foreseeable.  Only by com-
pletely ignoring the importance that Crawford places on govern-
ment involvement in the creation of the statement can the result
in Summers  be justified.  Thus, Crawford  limits “testimonial”
statements to those made in a setting or under circumstances
where the forseeability of such use would be obvious:  where the
government is involved in a present-day analogue to pretrial ex
parte examinations.
The Crawford majority repeatedly required government in-
volvement in order to render an out-of-court statement testimo-
nial.  As noted previously, the Court was careful to focus on the
type of abuse at which the Confrontation Clause was aimed:  the
use of pretrial ex parte examinations at trial.51  Further, the opin-
ion expressly referred to government involvement in describing
the type of evidence that is testimonial under the Confrontation
Clause.52  For example, in explaining why statements produced
by police interrogations are testimonial, the Court stated that
“[t]he involvement of government officers in the production of
testimonial evidence presents the same risk whether the officers
are police or justices of the peace.”53  In addition, the Court em-
phasized the peculiar risk presented by government involvement
in producing a testimonial statement that does not exist for non-
testimonial hearsay statements.  “Involvement of government of-
ficers in the production of testimony with an eye toward trial
presents unique potential for prosecutorial abuse—a fact borne
49 Id.
50 Id.  at 1303.
51 See supra Part I.A.
52 See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 56 n.7 (2004).
53 Id. at 53.
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out time and again throughout a history with which the Framers
were keenly familiar.”54  Thus, the Crawford opinion repeatedly
affirmed that the Confrontation Clause was directed at prevent-
ing the government from creating out-of-court testimonial state-
ments for use at trial in the absence of confrontation by the
accused.
Naturally, if an essential component of a testimonial statement
is government involvement in its creation, some out-of-court
statements made by a declarant will be accusatory but not testi-
monial .  The Crawford majority implicitly recognized this in its
footnoted discussion of dying declarations.55  A dying declaration
is a statement that concerns the cause or circumstances of a de-
clarant’s perceived impending death.56 Crawford noted that it is
indisputable that the dying declarations exception was recog-
nized as a general rule of criminal hearsay law.57  Then the Court
stated “many dying declarations may not be testimonial.”58  If
one assumes, as one must, that virtually all dying declarations
offered in a criminal trial are accusatory, then the Court is recog-
nizing that something more than the accusatory nature of a state-
ment is needed to make it testimonial.  The language of the
Crawford opinion, and the history of the Confrontation Clause,
clearly indicate that the “something more” is government in-
volvement in the creation of the statement.
Of course, a finding that a statement is not testimonial does
not mean that it is admissible.  It merely means that the state-
ment is not subject to the procedural requirements for testing
reliability mandated by the Confrontation Clause.59  Nontestimo-
54 Id. at 56 n.7.
55 See id. at 56 n.6.
56 See, e.g. , FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(2):
(b) Hearsay exceptions.  The following are not excluded by the hearsay
rule if the declarant is unavailable as a witness.
. . . .
(2) Statement under belief of impending death.  In a prosecution for
homicide or in a civil action or proceeding, a statement made by a
declarant while believing that the declarant’s death was imminent,
concerning the cause or circumstances of what the declarant be-
lieved to be impending death.
57 Crawford , 541 U.S. at 56 n.6.
58 Id.
59 Cf. id.  at 61 (“To be sure, the Clause’s ultimate goal is to ensure reliability of
evidence, but it is a procedural rather than a substantive guarantee.  It commands,
not that evidence be reliable, but that reliability be assessed in a particular manner:
by testing in the crucible of cross-examination.”).
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nial hearsay may still be inadmissible under the rules of evidence,
and many accusatory out-of-court statements will be found inad-
missible under those rules.  Further, as will be discussed, the sub-
stantive guarantee of reliability, which the Court has declared is
not to be found in the Confrontation Clause,60 is found in the
rules of evidence and in the Due Process Clause.61  Thus, accusa-
tory out-of-court statements that are not testimonial must never-
theless satisfy the reliability concerns of the rules of evidence and
due process.
C. The Plain Language of the Confrontation Clause Requires
Government Involvement in Creating
“Testimonial” Statements
In its guarantee of the right of confrontation, the Sixth
Amendment limits this right to “witnesses” against the accused.
Prior to Crawford , the Court had interpreted “witnesses”
broadly so that the Confrontation Clause was read to apply to
witnesses who were physically present and testifying at trial as
well as to all hearsay declarants whose statements were being of-
fered to prove the truth of the matter asserted.62  Professor Akhil
Reed Amar has argued persuasively that this misreading of the
Confrontation Clause stems from the Court’s misreading of the
term “witness,” which he argues should be given its “ordinary
everyday meaning.”63  For example, he poses a hypothetical situ-
ation in which A takes the witness stand at a trial and recounts
what B has told her.64  If B were asked if she had been a witness
at the trial, Professor Amar suggests that the truthful answer
would be “no,” as B may well not even be aware that her words
were paraphrased in court by A .65  Professor Amar also notes
that this plain meaning interpretation of who is a witness is con-
sistent with the use of the term “witness” in other parts of the
Constitution, such as the Treason Clause of Article III, Section 3,
which provides:  “[n]o Person shall be convicted of Treason un-
60 Id.
61 See infra Part II.
62 See  Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 62-63 (1980) (contending that the Confronta-
tion Clause, if read literally, would bar all hearsay statements made by a declarant
not present at trial).
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less on the Testimony of two Witnesses to the same overt Act, or
on Confession in open Court.”66  He explains that this clause is
obviously intended to require more than merely having A testify
to an overt act followed by A ’s repetition of B ’s out-of-court
statement indicating that the accused in fact engaged in the overt
act.67
Professor Amar recognizes that both the spirit and the letter of
the Confrontation Clause would be violated if the government
were able to avoid confrontation by preparing videotapes, tran-
scripts, depositions, and affidavits for court use and to be intro-
duced as testimony.68  Thus, he reasons that a “witness” is
someone “who physically takes the stand to testify, or (to pre-
vent government evasion of the spirit of the clause) a person
whose out-of-court affidavit or deposition (prepared by the gov-
ernment for in-court use) is introduced as in-court testimony.”69
The focus in Crawford on “testimonial” statements reflects a
similar plain meaning approach to the definition of the term
“witnesses” in the Confrontation Clause.  Citing Webster’s Dic-
tionary, the Court noted that a witness is one who bears testi-
mony,70 and that testimony is typically “[a] solemn declaration or
affirmation made for the purpose of establishing or proving some
fact.”71  Echoing Professor Amar’s distinctions between wit-
nesses and ordinary hearsay declarants, Crawford distinguishes
between testimonial and nontestimonial hearsay statements:
“An accuser who makes a formal statement to government of-
ficers bears testimony in a sense that a person who makes a cas-
ual remark to an acquaintance does not.”72  Therefore, it is the
government officials’ involvement in procuring a statement for
use at trial that transforms a statement from mere hearsay by a
declarant, which is not regulated by the Confrontation Clause,73
to a testimonial statement by a witness, which must comply with
the Confrontation Clause.74
66 Id.  at 128; U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3, cl. 1.
67 AMAR, supra  note 63, at 128.
68 Id. at 129 (noting that this interpretation would evade both the words and spirit
of the Treason Clause’s two-witness requirement).
69 Id. at 94 (emphasis added).
70 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51 (2004).
71 Id.
72 Id.
73 Id.  (“[N]ot all hearsay implicates the Sixth Amendment’s core concerns.”).
74 Id.  at 68.
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II
HEARSAY STATEMENTS THAT ARE NOT TESTIMONIAL MUST
BE RELIABLE TO BE ADMISSIBLE AND ARE SUBJECT TO DUE
PROCESS CONFRONTATION REQUIREMENTS
The Crawford opinion is explicit that the Confrontation
Clause is not  a substantive guarantee of reliability.75  Rather, it is
a procedural right guaranteeing that the testimonial evidence to
which it applies will be tested for reliability “in the crucible of
cross-examination.”76  It therefore seems that the admissibility of
hearsay evidence, other than testimonial hearsay, is not regulated
at all by the Confrontation Clause.  What, then, prevents the con-
viction of criminal defendants based upon unreliable, nontesti-
monial hearsay evidence?
One answer to that question is found in the text of Crawford :
“Where non-testimonial hearsay is at issue, it is wholly consistent
with the Framers’ design to afford the States flexibility in their
development of hearsay law. . . .”77  The hearsay rule and certain
exceptions thereto were in existence at the time the Sixth
Amendment was ratified,78 although hearsay law has evolved
considerably since that time.  Further, the reliability of an out-of-
court statement being admitted under a hearsay exception is a
key consideration in recognizing the exception.79  For example,
the federal hearsay exception for present sense impressions
found in Rule 803(1) is recognized because the contemporaneity
of the statement and the event being reported therein “negate
the likelihood of deliberate or conscious misrepresentation.”80
Similarly, the federal exception for excited utterances found in
Rule 803(2) is deemed reliable because the excited condition of
the declarant “temporarily stills the capacity of reflection and
75 Id.  at 61.
76 Id.
77 Id. at 68.
78 See  Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 243-44 (1895) (citing the well-settled
rule admitting a victim’s dying declarations at trial against his accused killer and
noting that this rule was known at the time the Confrontation Clause was drafted);
see also  Jack v. Mut. Reserve Fund Life Ass’n, 113 F. 49, 53-54 (5th Cir. 1902) (not-
ing that “exceptions to the hearsay rule are as well established as the rule itself”).
79 See FED. R. EVID. 801 advisory committee’s note (Introductory Note:  The
Hearsay Problem) (noting that under the common law a scheme evolved in which
there is a general rule excluding hearsay subject to many exceptions for statements
made “under circumstances supposed to furnish guarantees of trustworthiness”).
80 See FED. R. EVID. 803 advisory committee’s note (Notes to Paragraphs (1) and
(2)).
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produces utterances free of conscious fabrication.”81  Likewise,
statements made for the purpose of medical diagnosis or treat-
ment are excepted from the hearsay rule and are believed relia-
ble because a patient has a strong motivation to be truthful.82
Each exception to the rule against hearsay is premised upon a
theory supporting the reliability of the hearsay statement.  In-
deed, the federal residual hearsay exception, which is available to
admit certain hearsay statements not expressly covered by the
enumerated exceptions, has as its most basic requirement that
the hearsay statement have “equivalent circumstantial guaran-
tees of trustworthiness” to those statements that are explicitly ex-
cepted by Rules 803 and 804.83  Thus, the evolving evidentiary
rules concerning the admissibility of hearsay are very focused
upon issues of reliability as a predicate to admission into
evidence.
It might be asked whether the Crawford  Court’s recognition
that only testimonial evidence is regulated by the Confrontation
Clause, which affords states flexibility in their development of
hearsay law, invites the potential for states to permit the use of
unreliable, nontestimonial hearsay evidence against criminal de-
fendants.  Indeed, the potential for just such a result can be seen
when one compares Williamson v. United States84 with Lilly v.
Virginia .85  In Williamson , where the Supreme Court had before
it the scope of the federal hearsay exception for statements
against interest, the Court ruled that only those statements that
are actually against the penal interest of the declarant are suffi-
ciently reliable to be admitted under the exception.86  Five years
later, in Lilly , the Court was again considering whether a state-
ment against interest had been properly admitted against an ac-
complice.87  This time, however, the Court applied the reliability
standard that it has now rejected as the test for admission under
81 Id.
82 See FED. R. EVID. 803 advisory committee’s note (Note to Paragraph (4)).
83 See FED. R. EVID. 807 (“A statement not specifically covered by Rule 803 or
804 but having equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, is not ex-
cluded by the hearsay rule . . . .”).
84 512 U.S. 594 (1994).
85 527 U.S. 116 (1999).
86 Williamson , 512 U.S. at 600-01 (“The fact that a statement is self-inculpatory
does make it more reliable; but the fact that a statement is collateral to a self in-
culpatory statement says nothing at all about the collateral statement’s reliability.”).
87 Lilly , 527 U.S. at 122.
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the Confrontation Clause.88  The evidence would have run afoul
of the Williamson  standard under the federal rules, because the
statement at issue was a statement of an accomplice inculpating
the defendant.89  However, the Virginia Supreme Court had con-
cluded that the statement was admissible under Virginia’s
“against penal interest” hearsay exception, which it construed
more broadly than the United States Supreme Court had con-
strued the similar federal exception in Williamson .90  Because
each state’s highest court is charged with interpreting the scope
of that state’s rules, the Lilly Court did not have before it the
issue of whether the evidence was sufficiently reliable to be ad-
missible under Virginia’s hearsay rules.91  This illustrates that the
law governing the admissibility of hearsay can permit the admis-
sion of evidence that the courts of one jurisdiction find reliable
even though the courts of another jurisdiction would not admit
the same evidence, finding it too unreliable.  The danger in leav-
ing to each state’s legislature the task of declaring what hearsay is
sufficiently reliable to be admitted in a criminal case is obvious:
criminal defendants may not be protected against the admission
of unreliable hearsay evidence now that the Court has deter-
mined that the Confrontation Clause does not act as a substan-
tive guarantor of reliability.
There is a straightforward answer to this concern:  the Due
Process Clause imposes a reliability requirement on evidence.
The Court has been most expansive in considering reliability as a
due process concern in the context of identification evidence of-
fered against criminal defendants.92  In Manson v. Brathwaite,93
the Court considered whether the Due Process Clause compels
exclusion of identification evidence resulting from an unnecessa-
rily suggestive pretrial identification procedure.94 While ac-
knowledging the serious problems posed by unnecessarily
suggestive identification procedures, the Court held that the
linchpin in determining the admissibility of identification evi-
88 Id.  at 125, 134.
89 See id. at 120-21.
90 Id.  at 125.
91 Id. ; see also  Gurley v. Rhoden, 421 U.S. 200, 208 (1975) (“[A] State’s highest
court is the final judicial arbiter of the meaning of state statutes.”).
92 See, e.g.,  Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98 (1977); Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S.
188 (1972); Foster v. California, 394 U.S. 440 (1969); Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293
(1967).
93 432 U.S. 98 (1977).
94 Id.  at 99.
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dence under the Due Process Clause is the reliability of that evi-
dence.95  Thus, the Court recognizes that reliability of evidence
against criminal defendants is a due process concern.
The need to have some standard of reliability applied to non-
testimonial statements in the wake of Crawford is implied in sev-
eral post-Crawford decisions that continue to apply the Ohio v.
Roberts reliability standard after determining that an out-of-
court statement is not testimonial.  For example, in United States
v. Brun ,96 the Eighth Circuit held that statements made during a
911 call were not testimonial under Crawford .97 After making
that determination, the court applied the Ohio v. Roberts relia-
bility standard to determine the admissibility of the 911 call.98
These decisions that continue to apply Ohio v. Roberts as a Con-
frontation Clause standard are premised upon a misunderstand-
ing, which Crawford expressly refuted, that the Confrontation
Clause is a general guarantor of reliability.  Nevertheless, they
clearly reflect the need to have some guarantee that nontestimo-
nial hearsay statements will meet a uniform minimum standard
of reliability.  If, in light of the clear language in Crawford ,99 that
standard can no longer be tied to the Confrontation Clause, then
it must be found in the Due Process Clause.
Recently, in United States v. Hall ,100 the Ninth Circuit held
that Crawford does not apply to hearings on revocation of super-
vised release because the Confrontation Clause does not apply in
that context.  The court nevertheless found that the defendant
enjoyed a more limited “due process right to confront witnesses”
during the revocation proceeding.101  This explicitly recognized
95 Id.  at 114.
96 416 F.3d 703 (8th Cir. 2005).
97 Id. at 707.  In addition, the court also held that statements made by the victim
to the officers who responded to the crime scene were not testimonial. Id. at 707-08.
98 Brun , 416 F.3d at 707; see also  United States v. Franklin, 415 F.3d 537, 546 (6th
Cir. 2005) (finding that where nontestimonial statements are at issue it is completely
in line with Crawford to apply the Roberts reliability standard); Parle v. Runnels,
387 F.3d 1030, 1037-38 (9th Cir. 2004) (applying Roberts and progeny after finding
that statements admitted under California Evidence Code section 1370 were
nontestimonial).
99 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61 (2004) (noting that the Confrontation
Clause “commands, not that evidence be reliable, but that reliability be assessed in a
particular manner”).  For another view of the Due Process Clause as a check on
reliability in the wake of Crawford see Andrew E. Taslitz, What Remains of Reliabil-
ity: Hearsay and Freestanding Due Process After  Crawford v. Washington, 20 CRIM.
JUST. 39 (2005).
100 419 F.3d 980, 985 (9th Cir. 2005).
101 Id.  at 986.
\\server05\productn\O\ORE\84-4\ORE403.txt unknown Seq: 18 29-MAR-06 13:26
1110 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 84, 2005]
that due process requires a determination of the reliability of evi-
dence, including by confrontation, in situations where the Con-
frontation Clause does not apply.  Citing United States v.
Comito ,102 the Hall  opinion noted that the limited due process
confrontation rights require the court to weigh the releasee’s in-
terest in confrontation against the government’s good cause for
denying it as a predicate to determining the admissibility of hear-
say evidence.103  The weight to be accorded the releasee’s inter-
est in confrontation takes into account two considerations:  (1)
the importance of the evidence to the determination; and (2)
“the nature of the facts to be proven by hearsay evidence.”104
Concerning the importance of the hearsay evidence to the
court’s ultimate finding, one of the bases for revoking supervised
release in Hall consisted of allegations of domestic violence.105
The victim could not be located and the violation was proved in
part by admitting the victim’s hearsay statements to a physician
and to police officers.106  However, other non-hearsay evidence
of the acts of domestic violence were also admitted, which the
Hall court found sufficient to prove the domestic violence
charge.107  Based upon this, the court concluded that the
releasee’s interest in confrontation was weak.108
The hearing in Hall also concerned a second charge, false im-
prisonment, which lacked substantial non-hearsay proof.109  In
fact, evidence supporting the lower court’s finding on that charge
consisted almost entirely of the victim’s hearsay statements, and
the Ninth Circuit was required to consider the nature of the facts
to be proven by the hearsay evidence.110  With respect to these
statements, the court engaged in a determination of their reliabil-
ity.111  The court found that the statements bore indicia of relia-
bility,112 but did not end the inquiry there.  Instead, the reliability
of the hearsay evidence merely lessened, rather than defeated,
102 177 F.3d 1166 (9th Cir. 1999).
103 Hall , 419 F.3d at 986.
104 Id.
105 Id.
106 Id.  at 988.
107 Id.  at 986-87.
108 Id.  at 987.
109 Id.
110 Id.
111 Id.  at 987-88.
112 Id.
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the releasee’s due process right to confrontation.113  Ultimately,
however, the Hall court admitted the hearsay statements.114  The
court found that the releasee’s interest in confronting the victim,
which was lessened by the indicia of reliability of the hearsay
statements, was outweighed by the government’s good cause for
not producing her to testify (she could not be located and was
therefore unavailable).115
In short, for situations in which the Confrontation Clause (and
therefore, Crawford) does not apply, the Due Process Clause
provides a more limited confrontation right as a means of assur-
ing the reliability of evidence.  That right considers the need for
confrontation to test the reliability of the evidence, as measured
by the importance of the evidence to the determination of the
facts, as well as any indicia of reliability borne by the hearsay
statements.  Against this need for confrontation the court weighs
the State’s need to admit the hearsay evidence, as measured by
the government’s reasons for not producing the hearsay
declarant.
The due process right of confrontation will serve to provide a
uniform minimum standard of reliability for the admission of
nontestimonial hearsay evidence being offered against criminal
defendants at trial.  Therefore, the Confrontation Clause and the
Due Process Clause, as well as evidentiary limitations on the ad-
mission of hearsay, protect criminal defendants against unrelia-
ble hearsay in two distinct ways.  First, as to testimonial
hearsay—those statements that are obtained through govern-
ment involvement in a way similar to the ex parte examination
against which the Confrontation Clause was created to pro-
tect116—the defendants will be protected by the post-Crawford
limitations.  Those statements will be inadmissible unless the de-
clarant is testifying and is subject to cross-examination, or unless
the defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-examine the de-
clarant.117  In addition, even if the hearsay statement is not testi-
monial and is not subject to the requirements of Crawford , the
limitations contained in the rules of evidence provide assurance
113 Id.  at 988.
114 Id.  at 988-89.
115 Id.  at 989.
116 See supra  Part I.A.
117 Crawford v. Wshington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004) (“Where testimonial evidence is
at issue, however, the Sixth Amendment demands what the common law required:
unavailability and a prior opportunity for cross-examination.”).
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of reliability, and due process considerations limit the admission
of hearsay statements where the court determines that the defen-
dant’s interest in confrontation outweighs the government’s good
cause for not calling the witness to testify.
III
APPLYING THIS NEW FRAMEWORK IN THE CONTEXT
OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND
ABUSE CASES
Thus far this Article has proposed that “testimonial state-
ments,” as that term is used in Crawford , be limited to state-
ments in which government officers had been involved in the
production with an eye toward trial.118  While this is a definition
that is narrower than has been suggested by others,119 it is consis-
tent with an important aspect of Crawford .  Crawford  clearly
recognized that the Confrontation Clause is not a substantive
guarantee of reliability of evidence, but rather is a procedural
mechanism for testing the reliability of a particular type of evi-
dence:  testimonial hearsay.120  In calling for a more narrow defi-
nition of what is testimonial, this Article further suggests that
nontestimonial hearsay may nevertheless be excluded as a matter
of due process where the defendant’s interest in confrontation
outweighs the government’s good cause for not producing the
hearsay declarant.121  It is now useful to determine how this
framework would function in the cases that form the eye of the
hurricane of post-Crawford evidentiary issues:  domestic violence
and familial abuse cases.
As has been mentioned, domestic violence and familial abuse
cases typically rely heavily upon out-of-court statements made by
the victim.  Often victims become uncooperative, sometimes out
of fear because of threats made by the abuser,122 sometimes out
118 See supra Part I.
119 See, e.g. , Friedman, supra note 10, at 457-58 (opining that a definition of “testi-
monial” as one requiring government involvement would be a mistake); Lininger,
supra note 10, at 772-83, 818-19 (suggesting that 911 calls and statements to respond-
ing officers are likely testimonial and referring to the labeling of most statements by
victims to police as “non-testimonial” as “intellectually dishonest”); Mosteller supra ,
note 15, at 590-94 (favoring a broader definition of what is testimonial as a way of
giving the prosecution an incentive to procure like testimony).
120 Crawford , 541 U.S. at 61.
121 See supra Part II.
122 See  State v. Jacobs, 2 P.3d 974, 976-77 (Wash. Ct. App. 2000) (noting officer’s
experience that victims of domestic abuse are uncooperative because of fear of retri-
\\server05\productn\O\ORE\84-4\ORE403.txt unknown Seq: 21 29-MAR-06 13:26
Is Crawford a “Get Out of Jail Free” Card for Batterers and Abusers? 1113
of affection for the abuser once things have “cooled off,”123
sometimes out of fear of economic consequences if the prosecu-
tion succeeds,124 or sometimes because there are things in the
victim’s background that the victim would rather not discuss in
court.125  Most heartbreakingly, sometimes the victims are un-
available because their tender years render them incapable of
meeting even the minimal standards of witness competency re-
quired under the evidence codes.126  Whatever the reason, in
these types of cases the victims are far more likely to become
noncooperative or unavailable than in any other type of case.
Yet, without the victim’s statements in evidence, great difficulty
frequently arises in attempting to prove these cases.
There are five general categories of out-of-court victim state-
ments that have been relied upon in domestic violence and famil-
ial abuse cases:  (1) 911 calls;127 (2) statements made to
responding officers or medical providers;128 (3) formal state-
ments given to police or police investigators after the initial re-
sponse to the incident;129 (4) statements given to individuals
other than police officers and police investigators;130 and (5) dy-
bution from their attacker); see also  State v. Grant, 920 P.2d 609, 613-14 (Wash. Ct.
App. 1996) (discussing how many victims attempt to recant as an attempt to avoid
repeated violence).
123 See  United States v. Young, 316 F.3d 649, 654-55 (7th Cir. 2002) (describing
how victim of domestic violence recanted her statement and specifically stated that
she still loved her abuser, an event the court found not entirely uncommon).
124 See  Benton v. Superior Court, 897 P.2d 1352, 1355 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994) (rec-
ognizing the fact that most domestic abuse victims recant for various concerns in-
cluding economic dependency); see also  People v. Brown, 94 P.3d 574, 576 (Cal.
2004) (noting that financial dependency is a reason why some abuse victims recant).
125 See  Cheryl Hanna, No Right to Choose:  Mandated Victim Participation in Do-
mestic Violence Prosecutions , 109 HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1866 (1996) (citing prosecu-
tor of 1983 Alaska domestic abuse case stating:  “[W]hen the police get called and a
complaint is filed, it is no longer a private  matter.” (emphasis added)).
126 Cf. Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 809 (1990) (assuming, without deciding, that
a three-year-old child abuse victim was “unavailable” under witness competency
standards).
127 See, e.g. , People v. Corella, 18 Cal. Rptr. 3d 770 (Ct. App. 2004); State v. Wil-
liams, 695 N.W.2d 23 (Iowa 2005); People v. Moscat, 777 N.Y.S.2d 875 (Crim. Ct.
2004).
128 See, e.g. , United States v. Arnold, 410 F.3d 895 (6th Cir. 2005); Leavitt v.
Arave, 383 F.3d 809 (9th Cir. 2004); Fowler v. State, 829 N.E.2d 459 (Ind. 2005);
People v. Coleman, 791 N.Y.S.2d 112 (App. Div. 2005); Spencer v. State, 162 S.W.3d
877 (Tex. Ct. App. 2005).
129 See, e.g. , People v. Vigil, 104 P.3d 258 (Colo. Ct. App. 2004); Hammon v. State,
829 N.E.2d 444 (Ind. 2005).
130 See, e.g. , White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 350 (1992) (statements by abused child
to medical doctor offered into evidence); Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 809-10
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ing declarations.131  Each of these types of evidence will be con-
sidered separately under the proposed framework.
A. 911 Calls
Often the first information that the police receive about a
crime in progress comes in the form of a 911 call.  Tape record-
ings of these calls have frequently been offered into evidence in
domestic violence cases,132 but the admissibility of this evidence
is unsettled after Crawford .133  A number of lower courts have
reached varying results on this issue.  Some have found the state-
ments to be nontestimonial by limiting testimonial statements to
those produced when the government summons the citizen to be
a witness, distinguishing 911 calls in that it is the citizen who is
summoning the government.134  Other courts have concluded
that the statements are not testimonial because the caller’s pur-
pose was to secure help rather than in contemplation of a future
legal proceeding.135  Yet other courts have ruled that the 911 calls
are testimonial—thus subjecting them to Crawford strictures—
after finding that the caller was motivated by a desire to prose-
cute the defendant rather than to seek protection.136  And some
courts have examined the conduct of the 911 operator, holding
the statements made to the operator to be testimonial when the
court finds that the operator’s pattern of questioning was for the
purpose of investigation and prosecution.137  In sum, the courts’
(1980) (statements by abused children to medical doctors offered into evidence);
People v. Compan, 100 P.3d 533, 535 (Colo. Ct. App. 2004) (statement to doctor
entered into evidence); State v. Aaron, 865 A.2d 1135, 1139 (Conn. 2005) (state-
ments to mother offered into evidence); State v. Snowden, 867 A.2d 314, 317 (Md.
Ct. App. 2005) (statements to social worker entered into evidence); State v. Krasky,
696 N.W.2d 816, 817-18 (Minn. Ct. App. 2005) (statements to nurse entered into
evidence).
131 See, e.g. , Boone v. State, 668 S.W.2d 17, 20-21 (Ark. 1984) (statements to of-
ficer by dying child abuse victim entered into evidence).
132 See  Lininger, supra note 10, at 773.
133 Id.
134 See, e.g. , People v. Corella, 18 Cal. Rptr. 3d 770, 776 (Ct. App. 2004); People v.
Moscat, 777 N.Y.S.2d 875, 879 (Crim. Ct. 2004); State v. Forrest, 596 S.E.2d 22, 27
(N.C. Ct. App. 2004).
135 See, e.g. , People v. West, 823 N.E.2d 82, 91-92 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005); State v.
Wright, 686 N.W.2d 295, 302 (Minn. Ct. App. 2004); People v. Conyers, 777
N.Y.S.2d 274, 276-77 (Sup. Ct. 2004).
136 See, e.g. , State v. Powers, 99 P.3d 1262, 1266 (Wash. Ct. App. 2004) (victim
calling 911 to report defendant’s violation of a restraining order and giving his
description to aid in apprehension of defendant).
137 See, e.g. , People v. Cortes, 781 N.Y.S.2d 401, 404-07 (Sup. Ct. 2004).
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results seem to depend on whether the courts view the 911 call as
citizen initiated or government orchestrated and on what the
courts divine to be the purpose motivating the caller.  Continued
reliance on factors such as these to determine admissibility is not
likely to yield any easily predictable outcome as to whether the
911 call is testimonial within the meaning of Crawford .  But there
is a simple way to resolve these cases.
Returning to the letter and rationale of the Crawford opinion
as discussed above,138 the resolution of the admissibility of 911
calls after Crawford is clear. Crawford recognizes that the Con-
frontation Clause was aimed at the abusive practice of engaging
in ex parte witness examinations for the purpose of creating evi-
dence at trial.139  Although the government, through the person
of the 911 operator, is involved in obtaining the statements made
by the 911 caller, the reality is that a 911 call bears no resem-
blance to the pretrial ex parte witness examinations that the
Framers were trying to curb and that were discussed at length by
the Crawford opinion in reasoning that the Confrontation Clause
is limited to testimonial hearsay.140  It is also significant that the
government is not the initiator of 911 calls, which further under-
cuts the argument that a 911 call is the modern-day analogue to
the ex parte pretrial examinations conducted by government of-
ficers with an eye toward trial.  It is true that 911 calls may find
their way into evidence, but Crawford itself recognizes that the
mere fact that a hearsay statement is in evidence does not make
it testimonial and subject to the Confrontation Clause.141  There
is simply nothing in the Crawford opinion or in the historical un-
derpinnings relied upon in Crawford  to support a conclusion that
the Confrontation Clause was intended in any way to limit the
use of initial contact by civilians with police to report criminal
activity.  The statements made during 911 calls quite simply are
not testimonial hearsay within the meaning of Crawford .
Those statements made during 911 calls are  hearsay evidence
when offered at trial and, therefore, are subject to the reliability
138 See supra Part I.A.
139 See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 56 n.7 (2004).
140 See id.  at 42-50.  Part II of the Crawford  opinion, which is nine pages in length,
is devoted entirely to exploring the historical underpinnings of the Confrontation
Clause.
141 Id. at 68 (distinguishing between nontestimonial hearsay, which is not limited
by the Confrontation Clause, and testimonial hearsay, which is subject to the Con-
frontation Clause).
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requirements of the hearsay rules and, as discussed above,142 the
Due Process Clause.  Under the Due Process Clause, the court
must examine the strength of the defendant’s interest in confron-
tation.  If there is substantial nonhearsay evidence supporting the
determination of the case, the defendant’s interest in confronta-
tion is reduced.  Further, if the hearsay bears indicia of reliability,
the defendant’s interest in confrontation is reduced.  Against the
interest of the defendant in confrontation, the Court must weigh
the government’s reasons for not producing the declarant as a
witness.  Where the declarant is truly unavailable because he or
she cannot be located or refuses to testify, the government’s
showing of good cause will be compelling.  But if it is merely in-
convenient for the declarant to testify, or if the prosecutor is mo-
tivated by concerns that the declarant will be a “weak” witness,
then the government showing should be insufficient to outweigh
the defendant’s interest in confrontation.
B. Statements to Responding Officers
The officer responding to the scene of a crime is often called to
testify about statements made to him or her by those present.  It
appears that post-Crawford , prosecutors are confronting even
greater difficulty admitting victims’ statements made to respond-
ing officers than they are in admitting 911 calls.143
As with 911 calls, courts have taken varying approaches as to
whether, and for what reasons, these statements are testimonial.
Some courts have held that the statements are not testimonial,
focusing instead upon whether the witness could or should have
foreseen that the statement would be used at a criminal trial.144
Other courts have distinguished between the preliminary ques-
tioning that occurs at the crime scene and a more formal police
interrogation at a later time.145  But even in the latter category,
courts are not consistent in the criteria relied upon to determine
142 See supra Part II.
143 See  Lininger, supra  note 10, at 773, 776 (noting that fifty-six percent of prose-
cutors surveyed reported greater difficulty in introducing 911 tapes after Crawford ,
compared with eighty-seven percent who reported encountering greater difficulty in
introducing victims’ statements to responding officers).
144 See, e.g. , Lopez v. State, 888 S.2d 693, 698-99 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004); Peo-
ple v. Moscat, 777 N.Y.S.2d 875, 880 (Crim. Ct. 2004); People v. Conyers, 777
N.Y.S.2d 274, 277 (Sup. Ct. 2004).
145 See, e.g. , People v. Corella, 18 Cal. Rptr. 3d 770, 775-76 (Ct. App. 2004); Peo-
ple v. Coleman, 791 N.Y.S.2d 112, 114 (App. Div. 2005); State v. Forrest, 596 S.E.2d
22, 27 (N.C. Ct. App. 2004).
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whether the questioning is preliminary or more formal.146
Although there is language in Crawford that includes the de-
clarant’s reasonable expectations regarding whether his or her
statement would be used at trial as an element in finding hearsay
to be testimonial,147 the opinion does not expressly endorse any
particular formulation as to what comprises testimonial hearsay.
This language, taken from criminal defense-oriented briefs,148 is
apparently offered to give examples of possible formulations for
the definition of what is testimonial.  It is difficult to see how the
intent of the declarant by itself can transform an otherwise non-
testimonial statement into the modern-day equivalent of the pre-
trial ex parte examinations against which the Confrontation
Clause was designed to protect.
Those court decisions that focus on the formality of the ques-
tioning appear to be more true to the Framers’ intent as con-
strued in Crawford . Indeed, if what the Framers intended to
limit was the use of statements that the government obtains
through pretrial ex parte examinations conducted with an eye
toward trial, it is difficult to understand how a statement made to
a responding officer at a crime scene can be categorically charac-
terized as testimonial hearsay.  The focus of the responding of-
ficer will almost invariably be on determining what happened.
While it is likely that the responding officer, and possibly the de-
clarant, will realize that the declarant’s statements may be used
at trial, that is very different from the preordained taking of testi-
mony in a controlled environment (i.e., evidence gathered for the
purpose of offering it at trial) as taken at an ex parte examina-
tion.  The Crawford opinion expressly recognized that an accuser
who makes a “formal” statement to government officers “bears
146 Some courts consider the informality of the communication, see , e.g. , Forrest ,
596 S.E.2d at 27, while other courts reject this. See , e.g. , People v. Kilday, 20 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 161, 173 (Ct. App. 2004).  Some courts consider the setting, refusing to find
noncustodial statements testimonial, while other courts have found that hearsay
statements by out-of-custody declarants are testimonial. Compare  People v. Cage,
15 Cal. Rptr. 3d 846, 856-57 (Ct. App. 2004), with  People v. Sisavath, 13 Cal. Rptr.
3d 753, 758 (Ct. App. 2004).
147 See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51-52 (2004).
148 The brief of the defendant/petitioner would include as testimonial “similar
pretrial statements that declarants would reasonably expect to be used prosecutori-
ally,” and an amicus brief filed by the National Association of Criminal Defense
Lawyers would include as testimonial “statements that were made under circum-
stances which would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the state-
ment would be available for use at a later trial.” See id.
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testimony,”149 and that statements taken by the police officers in
the course of interrogations are also testimonial.150  But the opin-
ion qualified that proposition, saying “[p]olice interrogations
bear a striking resemblance to examinations by justices of the
peace in England.”151  If nothing else, this is an indication that
the type of police questioning that produces testimonial hearsay
is very different from the type of questioning performed by of-
ficers responding to a crime scene.  Unlike later police interroga-
tions, questioning at a crime scene is not pre-planned, and not
directed or guided by a prosecutor.  Rather, these are exchanges
of information dictated by necessity.  Statements obtained by re-
sponding officers may well be useful to the prosecution—or to
the defense—at trial, but they should not necessarily be subject
to the limitations imposed by the Confrontation Clause.
That the Confrontation Clause does not limit their use does
not guarantee their admissibility.  As is the case with 911 calls,
the hearsay statements produced during investigations by re-
sponding officers must satisfy the requirements of an exception
to the hearsay rule to be admissible.  Further, the more limited
due process right to confrontation requires the court to weigh the
defendant’s interest in confrontation against the government’s
reasons for not producing the declarant as a witness.
C. Statements Made During Police Interrogations
At first blush this appears to be the easiest category of hearsay
statements for which to resolve the question of what is testimo-
nial.  After all, Crawford itself concerned the application of the
Confrontation Clause to a statement made during a police inter-
rogation, and the Court held that “[s]tatements taken by police
officers in the course of interrogations are also testimonial under
even a narrow standard.”152  But the Court did not specify what
conduct on the part of the police constitutes an interrogation.  It
did not have to, because the defendant’s wife, whose statements
were at issue, was clearly being interrogated by the police.153  She
was in custody and had been read her Miranda warnings.154
149 Id. at 51.
150 Id. at 52.
151 Id.
152 Id.
153 Id. at 38.
154 Id.  The Miranda warnings include the advice that anything said may be used
in a court of law. See  Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966) (establishing
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Thus, it seems safe to assume that statements produced during
custodial police interrogation will always be testimonial and,
therefore, inadmissible unless the declarant testifies.
But is all questioning by the police “interrogation” that ren-
ders any statements produced thereby “testimonial”?  There is
some language suggesting that police interrogations under Craw-
ford might be limited to formal custodial interrogations.  For ex-
ample, the Court notes that police interrogations “bear a striking
resemblance to examinations by justices of the peace in En-
gland.”155  This suggests a formal examination in a government-
dominated setting, and gives rise to an argument that the ques-
tioning of individuals not in custody or in settings other than the
police stationhouse is unlike the English ex parte examinations,
and so statements produced thereby are not testimonial.  But
such an argument misses the mark.  If, as Crawford states, the
Confrontation Clause is intended to combat the risk of
prosecutorial abuse by government-created testimony,156 then it
is clear that this potential for abuse occurs whenever the govern-
ment is involved “in the production of testimony with an eye to-
ward trial.”157  Thus, it would seem more true to Crawford , and
to the purposes underlying the Confrontation Clause, to con-
clude that police “interrogation,” includes any police questioning
that is being recorded (electronically or otherwise) or that pro-
duces a written or signed statement by the person being ques-
tioned, with an eye toward using the statement at trial.  This
broad definition will encompass almost all police questioning,
save that which might occur during 911 calls or by a responding
officer at the crime scene as discussed above.158
D. Statements to Persons Other than Police Officers
Victims of domestic violence and familial abuse sometimes de-
scribe what has happened to them to persons other than police
officers.  For example, a child abuse victim may report the abuse
to a babysitter,159 a family member,160 a teacher,161 or a physi-
that both the interrogators and the declarant are aware of the potential for use of
the declarant’s statements at trial).
155 Crawford , 541 U.S. at 52.
156 Id. at 56 n.7.
157 Id.
158 See supra Part III.A-B.
159 See  Burrell v. Anderson, 353 F. Supp. 2d 55, 63 (D. Me. 2005) (inconsistent
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cian.162  Are statements made in these and other non-law en-
forcement contexts “testimonial” within the meaning of
Crawford?
As has been previously discussed,163 government involvement
in the creation of the out-of-court statement is a prerequisite to
determining that the statement is testimonial.  This would cate-
gorically eliminate statements made to individuals who are not
government officials or agents involved in the prosecution or in-
vestigation of the criminal case.164  Thus, statements made to pri-
vate parties not acting on behalf of government officials involved
in the prosecution or investigation of criminal cases would never
be testimonial within the meaning of Crawford .  Nonetheless, al-
though such statements are not subject to the Confrontation
Clause, they are still subject to the reliability requirements of the
rules of evidence and due process.
In some situations, however, there may be room to argue that
a statement made to someone other than a police officer is testi-
monial.  Some government employees, although their job respon-
sibilities do not include investigation and prosecution of criminal
cases, may be expected to receive statements that may bear upon
criminal prosecutions.  Examples include statements by crime
victims to social workers, emergency room physicians, and
paramedics.  But construing such statements as “testimonial”
merely because they happen to be relevant to a criminal prosecu-
tion distorts the holding and reasoning of Crawford . Crawford
explicitly recognized that nontestimonial hearsay evidence can
find its way into a criminal case unimpeded by Confrontation
statement by a child victim to babysitter and police); Christina T. v. Edith T., 229
Cal. Rptr. 247, 248 (Ct. App. 1986).
160 See  Bugh v. Mitchell, 329 F.3d 496, 499 (6th Cir. 2003) (mother).
161 See  Valentine v. Konteh, 395 F.3d 626, 629 (6th Cir. 2005) (“[T]he child told
her second-grade teacher that her stepfather had been abusing her.”); Offor v. Scott,
72 F.3d 30, 31 (5th Cir. 1995).
162 See, e.g. , Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 809 (1990) (statement to medical doc-
tor); United States v. Wipf, 397 F.3d 677, 681 (8th Cir. 2005) (statement to
psychologist).
163 See supra Part I.B.
164 In extending the definition of what statements are testimonial beyond those
obtained by judicial officers to those obtained during police interrogations, Craw-
ford  emphasizes that the judicial officers involved in the ex parte examinations in
England “had an essentially investigative and prosecutorial function.”  Crawford v.
Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 53 (2004).  Implicit in this is the recognition that not only
must the person who secures the statement be a government official, but that gov-
ernment official must be involved in the investigation and prosecution of criminal
cases.
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Clause strictures.165  Yet the focus of the Crawford determina-
tion of what is testimonial is on identifying “the modern practices
with closest kinship to the abuses at which the Confrontation
Clause was directed”166—ex parte examinations by government
officers with an eye toward trial.167  A doctor’s inquiry in the
course of treatment about how a patient was injured bears abso-
lutely no kinship to those ex parte pretrial examinations, even
though the response may happen to be relevant to a criminal in-
vestigation or prosecution.  Statements made in response to such
inquiries, therefore, should not be considered testimonial absent
a showing that the statement can be accurately characterized as
one made in response to an inquiry by government officers or
agents who had the purpose of creating testimonial evidence for
trial.168  Rather, their admission into evidence should depend
upon whether the statements meet the requirements of an excep-
tion to the hearsay rule and on whether the reliability standards
under the Due Process Clause are met.
E. Dying Declarations
Occasionally a domestic violence or familial abuse victim will
make a statement that qualifies for admission into evidence as a
dying declaration.  Typically, to be admissible under an exception
to the hearsay rule, the statement must be made while the declar-
ant believes his or her death is imminent and it must concern the
cause or circumstances of the perceived impending death.169
Some rules limit the admissibility of this evidence in criminal
cases to homicides,170 but others do not contain any such limita-
165 See id.  at 68 (noting that leaving state hearsay law the flexibility to regulate the
admission of nontestimonial hearsay, “is wholly consistent with the Framer’s
design”).
166 Id.
167 Id. at 56 n.7.
168 In footnote 8 of the Crawford  opinion, 541 U.S. at 58 n.8, the Court ques-
tioned its prior holding in White v. Illinois , 502 U.S. 346 (1992).  In that case, a child
abuse victim had made statements to a treating physician and to a police officer,
both of which had been admitted at trial. White , 502 U.S. at 349-50. Although the
footnote suggests that the victim’s statements to the police officer may have been
testimonial, which would make that case inconsistent with the outcome in Crawford ,
the footnote concerns only the statements to the police officer and ignores the state-
ments to the physician.  This implies that the victim’s statements—other than those
made in response to the police officer’s questioning—are not testimonial.
169 See, e.g. , FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(2); CAL. EVID. CODE § 1242 (West 2005).
170 See, e.g. , FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(2).
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tion.171  As Crawford recognizes, not all dying declarations are
testimonial.172  Indeed, one would assume that police interroga-
tions of crime victims who believe their own death to be immi-
nent are fairly rare.  Likely, most such statements are made to
medical personnel, paramedics, family members, friends, or by-
standers rather than to a police officer.  Those dying declarations
made to police officers responding to the crime scene would not
be testimonial for reasons already discussed.173
But even assuming that a dying declaration is made under cir-
cumstances that make it testimonial, Crawford notes that there is
authority for admitting the statement.174  While the Court does
not expressly decide whether the Confrontation Clause incorpo-
rates an exception for testimonial dying declarations,175 the
Court makes it clear that if such an exception must be accepted it
is sui generis.176  In any event, dying declarations will be admit-
ted in criminal cases either because they are not testimonial, or,
even if testimonial, because they are within a narrow historical
exception to the Confrontation Clause, or because the defendant
has forfeited his or her right to object177 on Confrontation Clause
grounds.
IV
ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS:  FORFEITURE AND
IMPEACHING HEARSAY EVIDENCE
Under Crawford, so much will depend upon the resolution of
the question of whether a hearsay statement is testimonial.  If it
is, Crawford teaches that the Confrontation Clause requires its
exclusion unless the declarant testifies and is subject to cross-ex-
amination concerning the statement, or the declarant is unavaila-
ble and the defendant had a prior opportunity for cross-
examination.178  And, if the determination is made that a hearsay
statement is not testimonial, it is admissible subject to its satisfac-
tion of reliability requirements imposed by the rules of evidence
171 See, e.g. , CAL. EVID. CODE § 1242 (West 2005).
172 Crawford , 541 U.S. at 56 n.6 (stating that many dying declarations are not
testimonial).
173 See supra Part III.B.
174 Crawford , 541 U.S. at 56 n.6.
175 Id.
176 Id.
177 See infra Part IV.
178 Crawford , 541 U.S. at 68.
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and due process.  In that event, no cross-examination may occur.
This Article will now consider briefly two related concerns:  (1)
forfeiture, which may permit admission of testimonial hearsay
evidence when a defendant has procured the declarant’s unavail-
ability as a witness; and (2) strategies for challenging the reliabil-
ity of nontestimonial hearsay in the absence of cross-
examination.
A. Forfeiture by Wrongdoing
It has long been recognized that a criminal defendant who pro-
cures the unavailability of a witness through wrongdoing forfeits
the right to object to the admission of that witness’ out-of-court
statements.179  This principle was expressly reaffirmed by Craw-
ford , which explicitly accepted that the rule of forfeiture by
wrongdoing extinguishes confrontation claims.180  Thus, if a pros-
ecutor can demonstrate that a witness was made unavailable by
means of the defendant’s wrongdoing, then the defendant cannot
object on Confrontation Clause grounds to the admission of that
witness’ testimonial hearsay statements.
At least two issues are raised by this rule.  One is the apparent
bootstrapping that must occur.  For example, assume that the de-
fendant is charged with the murder of a declarant whose testimo-
nial statement—taken in a police interrogation before the
declarant died—the prosecution seeks to offer.  The ultimate is-
sue in deciding whether the defendant has forfeited his right to
object to the admission of the statement is whether the defendant
killed the declarant.  In order for the statement to be admitted
because of forfeiture, the trial court must first make this determi-
nation.  Although this involves bootstrapping, that is not an in-
surmountable problem.  Courts frequently engage in this type of
bootstrapping when making evidentiary rulings admitting, for ex-
ample, co-conspirator statements, which may be offered to prove
that the defendant was involved in a conspiracy.181
A more serious concern will be whether the prosecution can
tie witness unavailability to the defendant’s wrongdoing.  The
179 See  Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 158-59 (1879).
180 Crawford , 541 U.S. at 62.
181 Co-conspirator statements are admissible against a defendant only after the
court determines that the declarant and defendant were co-conspirators.  Once the
court has made this preliminary determination, the fact finder can consider the co-
conspirator statement in order to determine whether the defendant engaged in the
conspiracy. See Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 180-81 (1987).
\\server05\productn\O\ORE\84-4\ORE403.txt unknown Seq: 32 29-MAR-06 13:26
1124 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 84, 2005]
simplest case in which this can be done is where the defendant is
charged with killing the declarant.  When the declarant is un-
available because he or she is dead, the reason for unavailability
is clear-cut.182  However, it is not always clear—particularly in
domestic violence or familial abuse cases—that the declarant’s
unavailability was procured by the defendant’s wrongdoing.  For
example, an abused spouse may become uncooperative because
she fears that the conviction of her husband will cause her eco-
nomic hardship, or because she genuinely loves him.  A young
child may become uncooperative after being removed from her
family environment for her own safety where she perceives this
removal to be a negative consequence of her telling what hap-
pened.  Or, the witness may just vanish, and there may be no way
of knowing what prompted the disappearance.  Therefore, in the
absence of proof of some connection between the defendant and
unavailability of the witness, forfeiture may not be a viable argu-
ment in favor of admitting testimonial hearsay.
B. Attacking Reliability Without Cross-Examination
When a statement is determined to be nontestimonial hearsay,
it will be admitted against a criminal defendant so long as it satis-
fies the reliability requirements established by the rules of evi-
dence and due process.183  But the defendant cannot further test
the reliability of those statements through cross-examination.  So
how might a defendant discredit the evidence?
One answer to this is to recognize that the credibility of the
declarant is in issue just as is the credibility of a testifying wit-
ness.  Thus, the credibility of the declarant can be attacked by
any evidence that would be admissible for this purpose had the
declarant testified as a witness.184  This can include admission of
statements or conduct inconsistent with the nontestimonial hear-
say evidence, evidence of motive or bias, or evidence of poor
character for veracity, just to name a few of the more common
ways to discredit witnesses and witness testimony.
182 Indeed, one commentator has suggested that rather than treating dying decla-
rations as an exception to the Confrontation Clause, it should be understood as a
forfeiture situation:  the defendant forfeits the right to exclude the out-of-court
statements of someone he is accused of killing so long as sufficient evidence exists to
support a preliminary finding that the defendant did, in fact, kill the declarant. See
Friedman, supra note 10, at 464-67.
183 See supra  Part II.
184 See, e.g. , FED. R. EVID. 806; CAL. EVID. CODE § 1202 (West 2005).
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Finally, the jury should be reminded that it has not had an op-
portunity to test the credibility of the declarant by observing his
or her demeanor under cross-examination, or by watching the
declarant making his or her accusation in the defendant’s pres-
ence.  This reminder should be included in the defense’s argu-
ment and in an instruction to the jury.
CONCLUSION
Crawford has radically changed our understanding of the Con-
frontation Clause and its limitations on the admission of hearsay
evidence.  As noted at the outset, these changes have had per-
haps their greatest impact upon domestic violence and familial
abuse cases, where it can be expected that the battle over what is
“testimonial hearsay” will be waged with increasing frequency.
Yet, as this Article demonstrates, the effect of Crawford on these
prosecutions need not be draconian.  Many, particularly in the
criminal defense bar, will no doubt take exception to the narrow
definition that this Article proposes for “testimonial hearsay.”  It
may be some time before the Court provides a clearer indication
of which types of hearsay statements will found to be testimonial
and which will not.185 But the Crawford decision makes it appar-
ent that the answer is to be found by keeping our eyes fixed upon
the objective of the Framers who drafted the Confrontation
Clause:  eliminating the abusive practice of admitting in criminal
trials statements produced by government officials’ ex parte pre-
trial examination of witnesses.  The narrow focus of the Framers
dictates a relatively narrow definition of what comprises testimo-
nial hearsay for Confrontation Clause purposes, leaving the regu-
lation of nontestimonial hearsay in criminal cases to the rules of
evidence and to the Due Process Clause.
185 The Supreme Court recently heard argument in two cases that may shed light
on the issue of what is testimonial evidence.  One of the cases, Davis v. Washington ,
No. 05-5224, concerns whether statements made in a 911 call are testimonial.  The
Washington Supreme Court had held by a vote of 8-1 that they were not.  In the
other case, Hammon v. Indiana , No. 05-5705, statements made by a victim to a po-
lice officer responding to a report of domestic violence were held by the Indiana
Supreme Court not to be testimonial.  The cases were both argued March 20, with a
ruling in each expected by late June.
\\server05\productn\O\ORE\84-4\ORE403.txt unknown Seq: 34 29-MAR-06 13:26
1126 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 84, 2005]
